The Determinants of Individuals’ Attitudes Towards Preventing Environmental Damage by Benno Torgler & Maria A. Garcia-Valiñas
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 





The Determinants of Individuals’ 
Attitudes Towards  Preventing 
Environmental Damage 
Benno Torgler and  Maria A. Garcia-Valiñas 
 
















Benno Torgler, Yale Center for International and Area Studies 
Leitner Program in International & Comparative Political Economy  













This paper investigates empirically the determinants of individuals’ attitudes towards 
preventing environmental damage in Spain using data from the World Values Survey 
and European Values Survey for the periods 1990, 1995 and 1999/2000. Compared to 
many previous studies, we present a richer set of independent variables and found that 
strongly neglected variables such as political interest and social capital have a strong 
impact on individuals’ preferences to prevent environmental damage. An interesting 
aspect in our study is the ability to investigate environmental preferences over time. The 
results show strong differences over time. Finally, using disaggregated data for Spanish 
regions, we also find significant regional differences.   
 
 
Keywords: Environment, Regional and time Preferences, Political interest, Social 
capital 
JEL Classification: Q260, R220, Z130, I210 
 
















Address for correspondence: 
 
Benno Torgler  
Yale Center for International and Area Studies 
Leitner Program in International & Comparative Political Economy 
34 Hillhouse Avenue 
P.O. Box 208206 
New Haven 
CT 06520  
USA 





There is a wide range of studies that have valued environmental preferences. Interest in 
environmental attitudes began in the early 1970s (Bord and O’Connor 1997). The 
preferences for protecting environmental goods has been a controversial issue in the last 
few years. The majority of those studies focused on specific and limited environmental 
goods or areas (Whitehead 1991, Stevens et al. 1994, Danielson et al. 1995, Cameron 
and Englin 1997, Blomquist and Whitehead 1998, Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman 
2000, Popp 2000, Bulte et al. 2004, Dupont 2004). 
Thus, it is difficult to find contributions related to a country or a group of 
countries and considering an environmental damage perspective as a whole (Engel and 
Pötchske 1998, Witzke and Urfei 2001, Israel and Levinson 2004). They furthermore 
have the disadvantage of an excessive simplification, because individuals are asked 
about the environment in general. As Witzke and Urfei (2001, p. 208) pointed out, this 
is likely to bias downwards environmental preferences, because people did not know 
what they should pay for. However, with a general perspective, embedding effects 
which are usually linked to specific environmental commodities, can be avoided 
(Diamond and Hausman 1994). 
It is a promising line to consider empirically citizens’ environmental preferences 
and search for factors that shape it. Relatively new surveys such as the World Values 
Surveys or the European Values Survey allow to find a proxy for and thus to check the 
impact on environmental attitudes. This attempt is in line with the growing inclination 
among economists to use surveys (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997, for social capital 
studies, or Frey and Stutzer 2002, who intensively investigated happiness, or Torgler   3
2005, focusing on tax morale). One reason might be that survey research now uses more 
sophisticated statistical techniques and designs compared to early years. Furthermore, a 
main advantage is that surveys include many control variables. We will take advantage 
of it and use a rich set of independent variables to investigate in detail what shapes 
individuals’ environmental values in Spain. Another main advantage in this study is to 
work with several datasets collected at three different points in time, which allows us to 
observe trends over time and thus assess the robustness of our results. 
A clear advantage of national studies in this field is the possibility to design 
country-level environmental initiatives. It also allows to go from a general perspective 
to a local one, assuming that regional information is available. Such an approach would 
allow, for example, to design optimal fiscal decentralization policies (Shapiro 1996)
1.  
A cross country and cultural comparison with a single item measure as the one 
used as dependent variable in this paper can pose some problems, as values are not free 
from cultural or institutional influences. Focusing on one country, Spain, and thus 
conducting a country case study helps to reduce such problems.  
Before considering the findings in detail, Section II of the paper first introduces 
the way individuals’ environmental attitudes are defined, provides information about the 
World Values Surveys and the European Values Survey, introduces the model, and 
presents our hypotheses. In Section III we present the empirical findings, and Section 
IV finishes with some concluding remarks. 
 
 
                                                 
1 It has been argued that if there is heterogeneity among jurisdictions, centralization is suboptimal 
(Peltzman and Tideman 1972, Oates and Schwab 1996). This is because strong differences in 
preferences among governments could lead to important efficiency losses for some jurisdictions 
(Burtraw and Porter 1991, Dinan et al. 1999).   4




The data used in the present study are taken from the World Values Survey (WVS, 
years 1990, 1995, 2000) and the 1999 European Values Survey (EVS)
2. The World 
Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change, based 
on representative national samples. It was first carried out in 1981-83, and subsequently 
in 1990-91, 1995-96 and 1999-2001. Data from these surveys are made publicly 
available for use by researchers interested in how views change with time. However, 
economists have just started to work with the WVS/EVS. To assess environmental 
attitudes of individuals in Spain we use the following question from these data sets 
throughout the whole paper:  
I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental damage (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) 
 
Although we do not conduct a contingent valuation study (CV), the question offers the 
chance to investigate environmental preferences. However, the question is not free of 
problems. The statement is relatively vague. “Environmental damage” is not clearly 
specified. Different people may think of different kinds of environmental damages. The 
level of improvement and the degree of tax increase are not clarified either. So people 
are not aware of how much they have to pay
3. The consequences of taxation are not 
mentioned either. No information is provided to which extent income tax, value added 
tax or other taxes are supposed to increase. Thus, it is not clear who will have the 
                                                 
2 A dummy variable has been included to differentiate between WVS and EVS.  
3 It has been shown that the preferences to protect the environment (regarding causes and consequences of 
environmental damages) depend on the level of information the questionnaire includes (Bulte et al. 
2004).   5
highest tax burden. On the other hand, unspecified payment schemes will increase the 
variance, but may influence the willingness to contribute (Witzke and Urfei 2001). An 
unspecified statement still helps to measure preferences and values, and to reduce 
strategic behaviour via influencing the quantity or quality of environmental goods  – 
people might intentionally indicate false willingness to contribute values in order to 
match their own preferences (Hidano et al. 2005). When neither specific goods nor 
quantitative values are used, the attributes of the environmental goods in questions do 
not have to be thoroughly explained to be sure that respondents understand and respond 
with the appropriate willingness to accept an increase in taxes 
4.  
We take advantage of the scaled structure using ordered probit estimations rather 
than establishing a voting or referendum situation with a “yes or no” structure. This 
allows to consider also intermediate values between strong agreement and 
disagreement, and therefore to make full use of the data available. Our variable 
furthermore measures the marginal and not the total willingness to to accept a tax 
increase. This implies that the change over time is also influenced by the change of 
governments’ environmental activities. Environmental improvements over time may 
reduce that willingness to be spent to prevent environmental damages, as might the 
current level of the tax burden. Nevertheless, only a limited number of papers 
investigate environmental preferences over time, controlling in a multivariate analysis 
for additional factors.  
A critical aspect of surveys is the fact that studies can be biased if they do not 
cover a representative share of the population. A high response rate is therefore 
essential. We work with well-known data that cover many countries and have been 
conducted on a regular basis. These surveys pay especial attention to the 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion regarding possible survey biases see Carson and Mitchell (1995).   6
representativeness of the data set. Furthermore, the environmental question was only 
part of a larger survey, which may reduce environmental framing biases. We have the 
advantage to be able to control for many factors in a multivariate analysis, but also the 
disadvantage that only a limited number of environmental aspects can be investigated. 
However, in a specific environment survey the expressed environmental attitudes might 
be overstated if the respondent takes the interviewer to be an environmental activist and 
would feel guilty if stating a low willingness to accept an increase in taxes; such an 
upward bias should occur less in the database we use (Witzke and Urfei 2001).  
Finally, it can also be discussed whether it is more adequate to use an index 
instead of a single question to measure environmental values. Many studies that 
examine environmental attitudes typically measure environmental values using a single 
item
5. A single question has the advantage that problems associated with the 
construction of an index can be avoided. Furthermore, an index might be designed to fit 
best the theoretical argumentations. As we analyze one specific country, problems based 
on differences in the interpretation of the question or due to differences in the political 
institution, which may influence environmental values, do not appear. Working with 
more than one survey and thus considering different time periods allows to reduce 
biases due to a “time specific mood”. 
 
 




In this section we introduce the model and develop the predicted influences of our 
independent variables. We will pool the available years using time dummy variables 
and investigate the development over time. Working with several datasets collected at 
                                                 
5 For a review see, e.g., Zelezny et al. (2000).    7
three different points in time allows to observe trends over time and to find robust 
results. So, the willingness to contribute for preventing environmental damage is 
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ENVATi measures an individual’s attitudes towards preventing environmental damages. 
The independent variables considered are shown in Table 1; the set of variables 
included in the estimations is much broader than in several previous studies. 
Additionally, we provide the expected sign for each variable. 
First of all, we consider a bundle of socio-demographic and economic variables, 
which have an important influence on preferences for environmental quality. Some 
factors commonly included in such studies are age
6 and gender (see, for example, 
Whitehead 1991, Cameron and Englin 1997, Blomquist and Whitehead 1998, Engel and 
Pötchske 1998, Witzke and Urfei 2001, Dupont 2004, Israel and Levinson 2004, Hidano 
et al. 2005).  
 
 
                                                 
6 An alternative specification related to age has been proposed by Popp (2001), in order to test the 
existence of weak and strong altruism towards future generations in the context of environmental issues. 
In his study, he included the individuals’ life expectancy, calculated from their age and the life 
expectancy using the Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
   8
Table 1: Independent Variables 




Socio-Demographic Factors (SOCDEM)      
AGE   Continuous  ---  - 
GENDER Dummy  MALE  (reference  group) 
FEMALE 
+ 
MARITAL STATUS   Dummy  MARRIED; DIVORCED; SEPARATED; 
WIDOWED; SINGLE (r.g.) 
+ 
Formal and Informal Education (EDUC)      
EDUCATION Continuous  ---  + 
DISCUSSING POLITICS  Scaled  1 = never  to 3 = frequently + 
INTEREST IN POLITICS  Scaled  1 = not at all interested  to 4 = very interested + 
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS  Scaled  1 = not at all important to 4 = very important + 
Idealogy (IDEOLG)      
RIGHTIST POLITICAL ORIENTATION  Scaled  1 = left to 10 = right - 
Economic Situation (ECONSIT)      
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION  Scaled  1 = dissatisfied to 10 = satisfied + 
ECONOMIC CLASS  Dummy  UPPER CLASS; UPPER MIDDLE CLASS; 
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS; 
WORKING/LOWEST CLASS (r.g.) 
+ 
Occupational status (EMPLOY)      
EMPLOYMENT STATUS  Dummy  FULL TIME EMPLOYED (r.g.); PART TIME 
EMPLOYED; SELFEMPLOYED; 
UNEMPLOYED; AT HOME; STUDENT; 
RETIRED; OTHER 
+/- 
Social Capital (SCAPITAL)      
TRUST Scaled  0  =  can’t be too careful  or 
1 = most people can be trusted 
  
+ 
MEMBERSHIP IN A VOLUNTARY ENV. 
ORG. 
Dummy  MEMBER VOLUNT.; NOT A MEMBER 
(r.g.) 
+ 
Identification (IDENTIFIC)      
NATIONAL PRIDE  Scaled  1 = not at all proud to 4 = very proud + 
PERCEIVED GEOGRAPHICAL GROUP  Dummy  LOCALITY OR TOWN (r.g.); STATE OR 
REGION; COUNTRY AS A WHOLE; 
CONTINENT AS A WHOLE; WORLD AS A 
WHOLE 
+ 
Other Variables      
SIZE OF TOWN (URBANI) Dummy  UNDER 2,000 (r.g.); 2,000-5,000; 5,000-
10,000; 10,000- 20,000; 20,000-50,000; 
50,000-100,000; 100,000-500,000; 500,000 
and MORE 
+/- 
SPANISH REGION (REGION) Dummy  17 SPANISH AUTONOMOUS REGIONS: 
MADRID (r.g.) 
+/- 




Regarding AGE, we expect the number of individuals who are willing to contribute for 
additional environmental protection to fall with an increase of age, since older people 
will not live to enjoy the benefits of preserving resources for later years. There are two 
age effects, a life cycle or aging effect due to being at a certain stage of age and a cohort 
effect resulting from belonging to a specific generation. The cohort effect covers the   9
difference of attitudes between different age-cohorts due to generational differences in 
socialization, life experiences and economic conditions. People of a similar age have 
experienced similar historical and economic conditions and thus similar restrictions and 
possibilities. On the other hand, aging might have the effect that people become more 
cautious, more risk averse and more conservative, but also the reverse effect, as they 
expect a lower profit from preserving the environment (see Vlosky and Vlosky 1999). 
However, in our study we cannot differentiate between these effects.  
  GENDER is another specific variable. Experimental and empirical studies have 
shown gender differences in other aspects such as charitable giving, tax morale, 
bargaining or household decision making (Brown-Kruse and Hummels 1993, Nowell 
and Tinkler 1994, Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, Eckel and Grossman 2001, Torgler 
2005). It is often argued that traditional gender socialization, cultural norms, the 
women’s roles as caregivers and nurturers, encouragements to be cooperative and feel 
compassion lead to a higher concern for the maintenance of life and environment. The 
“traditional” domain of working at home induces a greater likelihood to engage 
privately in behaviors aiming at the preservation of the environment (for an overview 
see Hunter et al. 2004). Women have a tendency to be more concerned with the 
environment than men. Zelezny et al. (2000) find strong evidence that 
environmentalism does not begin in adulthood, which contradicts the statement that 
gender differences arise due to motherhood and child protection. Regardless of age, 
women show more concern for the environment than men. However, literature reviews 
in the 80s report that the relationship between environmental attitudes and gender is 
meager and inconsistent (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980, Hines, Hungerford and Tomera 
1986-1987, Mohai 1992). The meta-review of Zelezny et al. (2000) covering the years 
1988 and 1998 reports that out of 13 studies, 9 found that women are significantly more   10
active in pro-environmental behaviors than men, 3 found no statistically significant 
difference between males and females and one study reports a greater participation of 
men. Davidson and Freudenburg (1996), Bord and O’Connor (1997), Berrens et al. 
(1997) and Zelezny et al. (2000), Hunter et al. (2004) found higher values for women, 
while Cameron and Englin (1997), Swallow et al. (1994) and Kealy et al. (1990) found 
the opposite result. Finally, Brown and Taylor (2000) did not find any gender difference.  
It can also be criticized that studies relying on self-reports might be biased if 
women give more socially desirable responses in surveys. However, Zelezny and 
Yelverton (2000) report that social desirability is not related to gender. Furthermore, 
individuals’ willingness to accept a tax increase could also be a function of risk 
attitudes, which was not possible to control for in this study. This would have allowed 
to gain better insights regarding the variables age, gender, or economic situation, as 
possible differences between women and men, or between different age groups could 
rather derive from different risk attitude functions. Controlling for risk aversion may 
lead to a stronger negative impact of age, as older people are supposed to be more risk 
averse than younger ones and may lead to a smaller difference between sexes, as 
according to some authors women are more concerned with the risk a poor 
environmental quality implies (Stern et al. 1993, Dupont 2004). 
Additionally, MARITAL STATUS might influence environmental attitudes as 
well. Married people are more compliant or more concerned about environmental 
degradation than others, especially compared to singles, because they are more 
constrained by their social network and often strongly involved in the community (Tittle 
1980). They furthermore might be more concerned with local environmental problems 
than singles as the “parent effect” makes them seek their children’s future welfare 
(Dupont 2004).   11
The formal EDUCATION is a key variable. As a proxy for this variable we use 
the age at which individuals completed or will complete their full time education. In 
particular, the literature has shown that formal education
7 has a significant influence on 
environmental willingness to contribute (Whitehead 1991, Danielson et al. 1995, 
Blomquist and Whitehead 1998, Engel and Pötchske 1998, Popp 2001, Witzke and 
Urfei 2001, Israel and Levinson 2004, Veisten et al. 2004). In this respect, it is a general 
finding that higher levels of education lead to clear preferences for environmental 
protection.  
On the other hand, also informal education matters (Whitehead, 1991, Blomquist 
and Whitehead 1998, Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman 2000, Hidano et al. 2005). Well-
informed citizens who know about environmental problems might have stronger 
environmental attitudes, because they are better aware of the possible damage 
(Danielson et al. 1995). Thus, not only formal education should have an impact on the 
willingness to accept an increase in taxes. One possibility is to measure the individuals’ 
political interest. We will use several proxies to check the robustness of the results 
(level of: DISCUSSING POLITICS
8, INTEREST IN POLITICS
9 and IMPORTANCE 
OF POLITICS
10). On the other hand, it can be assumed that politically interested people 
are well-informed and have a high level of current knowledge about what is going on in 
politics and thus may also be aware of environmental issues and problems which are 
supposed to lead to a higher willingness to contribute. Compared to other determinants, 
the aspect of political interest has been widely neglected in the environmental literature.  
                                                 
7 The formal education is usually specified by levels or degrees. It has been alternatively approached by 
means of the number of years (Blomquist and Whitehead 1998).  
8 Question: ‘When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters 
frequently, occasionally or never?’. 
9 Question: ‘How interested would you say you are in politics?’. 
10 Question: ‘How important is politics in your life?’.     12
This brings us to a further factor connected to politics. The party individuals 
vote for (Engel and Pötchske 1998, Witzke and Urfei 2001) and their ideology are 
important aspects too. For example, voters who choose ‘green’ parties have strong 
preferences for environmental protection. It has been observed that left parties’ voters 
show a higher sensitivity for environmental problems (Witzke and Urfei 2001). The 
latter finding can be explained by the higher preferences for economic growth ‘right-
wing’ parties’ voters have. This is a generally quite unexplored question that requires 
more attention. We use the degree of RIGHTIST POLITICAL ORIENTATION
11 as a 
proxy for ideology.   
 The economic situation of an individual is a significant aspect too. It can be 
argued that the protection of the environment or in our case the prevention of 
environmental damage is not only a public good, but also a normal good. Thus, demand 
may increase with income (Franzen 2003). Wealthier citizens may have a higher 
demand for a clean environment and less environmental damages. As a proxy for 
income
12 we use the individual perception of people’s ECONOMIC CLASS. 
Investigating also environmental attitudes in different Spanish regions, we find it 
important to maximize the number of observations and thus to choose an alternative 
measure of income. Individuals with a higher income have less pressing economic 
problems and are therefore more willing and able to reduce their standard of living to 
spend more money on global environmental problems.  
But the perception of pressure may depend on the financial satisfaction of an 
individual and not per se on the level of income. To consider this, we include the 
                                                 
11 Question: ‘In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your 
views on this scale, generally speaking? Scale from 1 to 10’.  
12 In this paper, we include economic situation variables sequentially into the estimations, due to the 
relatively high number of missing values. 
   13
variable FINANCIAL SATISFACTION. Financial dissatisfaction might negatively 
influence the preference to pay more taxes in order to protect the environment. Such 
dissatisfaction can create a sense of distress, especially when taxes have to be paid and 
there is a discrepancy between the actual and the aspired financial situation. Thus, taxes 
might be perceived as a strong restriction, which increases the incentives not to 
contribute. As in one case the income variable is integrated in the equation, we can 
analyze the “stress” component of financial dissatisfaction. 
Income has in general been considered in the literature (Whitehead 1991, 
Stevens et al. 1994, Blomquist and Whitehead 1998, Popp 2001, Witzke and Urfei 
2001, Bulte et al. 2004, Dupont 2004, Israel and Levinson 2004, Veisten et al. 2004, 
Hidano et al. 2005). Usually, a positive relationship between income and environmental 
preference to contribute has been found. Sometimes, several income categories have 
been included in the estimations (Israel and Levinson 2004). This fact can be seen as a 
way to test the Kutznets´ hypothesis
13.   
  An additional variable that approaches and complements the economic situation 
of individuals is their occupational status (EMPLOYMENT STATUS). Witzke and 
Urfei (2001) found that some labour groups, such as persons engaged in the household 
or on maternity leave, had higher environmental preferences. Veisten et al. (2004) 
showed that unemployed people present, occasionally, lower preferences for 
environmental protection policies. However, the latter relationship sometimes is neither 
clear nor significant at all (Engel and Pötchske 1998, Witzke and Urfei 2001).  
                                                 
13 The so-called Kutznets curve (Selden and Song 1994, Grossman and Krueger 1995) reflects the 
relationship between pollution and economic activity. That relationship usually is shown as a not linear 
function, by means of an inverted U-shaped curve. Even an inverted N-shaped curve has been proposed 
(Holtz-Eakin and Selden 1995, Cole et al. 1997).   14
An aspect which has been strongly neglected in the literature is social capital. 
This topic has been studied by many different disciplines. It has advanced to an 
important concept in social sciences, enforcing the interdisciplinary social discourse 
among researchers. The rapid growth of the social capital literature underlines a 
widespread unease with the standard explanations for the differential political and 
economic performances not only across nations but also across sub-national 
jurisdictions (see Ostrom and Ahn 2003, Schaltegger and Torgler 2005). According to 
Paldam (2000, p. 630), there are three families of social capital concepts: trust, 
cooperation and network. He points out that “most people build trust in and networks to 
others and come to cooperate with them” (p. 629). Trust and cooperation are closely 
related. Consequently, trust could be a crucial aspect in explaining also individuals’ 
attitudes to contribute for environmental protection. In this respect, we have used two 
social capital proxies. First, we investigate the impact of generalized TRUST
14 and thus 
the belief to which extent most people can be trusted affects environmental attitudes. As 
an alternative measurement, the social capital literature uses membership in voluntary 
organizations. Additionally, it is useful to investigate the MEMBERSHIP IN A 
VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION as a variable. Some previous 
studies have used this variable (see, e.g., Whitehead 1991, Blomquist and Whitehead 
1998, Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman 2000). It can be expected that individuals who 
participate actively in environmental institutions have stronger preferences for 
environmental protection, as one of the major aims in an environmental group is the 
provision of public environmental goods through voluntary contribution. However, the 
causality is not clear. There may be a potential selection  bias. People with strong 
environmental preferences may choose to participate in a voluntary environmental 
                                                 
14 Question:  ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too 
careful in dealing with people?’.   15
organization. Such an argument would imply a reverse causality. To control for such a 
problem, we will use an instrumental approach in the empirical part to check the 
robustness of the results.  
  We also investigate the identification with the state, which may induce a higher 
cooperation among individuals and a higher preference to preserve a country’s 
environmental conditions. NATIONAL PRIDE
15 can be used as a proxy for national 
identification. Tyler (2000) argues that in general pride influences people’s behavior in 
groups, organizations and societies. It gives a basis for encouraging cooperative 
behavior. However, contrary to the trust variables, which have been thoroughly 
analyzed by social capital researchers, the variable pride has been completely 
neglected
16 in economics although it is a widespread phenomenon (Boulding 1992).  
We predict that a higher level of pride leads to stronger environmental attitudes.  
Close to the concept of national identity are individuals’ perceptions to which 
geographic groups they belong first of all. This is an unexplored issue, so we have 
considered the perceived GEOGRAPHIC GROUP
17. It is difficult to obtain a clear 
prediction. Individuals who see themselves as citizens of the world as a whole may have 
relatively high environmental values, due the fact that in many cases environmental 
pollution produces high externalities at the world level. On the other hand, individuals 
strongly attached to the local area are less likely to act as free-riders and have a stronger 
willingness to reduce environmental damages at the local level and thus a higher 
willingness to accept higher taxes in order to preserve the environment
18. As our 
                                                 
15 Question: ’How proud are you to be …….? Scale from 1 to 4’. 
 
16 Torgler and Schneider (2005) find empirically a strong correlation between pride and tax morale.  
17 Question: To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all? 
18 However, the willingness to pay higher taxes may dependent on the fiscal autonomy of the locality. A 
higher fiscal autonomy should enforce such an argument.     16
dependent variable does not give clear information about the environmental damage, 
both aspects can have an impact on individuals’ environmental attitudes.  
The literature has investigated factors such as the city/town size (Carlsson and 
Johansson-Stenman 2000, Israel and Levinson 2004), the rural/urban character of the 
place where a household is located
19 (Danielson et al. 1995, Veisten et al. 2004), or the 
proximity to the damaged area (Bulte et al. 2004). In line with these studies we use a 
proxy that measures different SIZES OF TOWNS as dummy variables. In general, the 
expected sign of the relationship is not clear. On the one hand, it can be argued that 
small towns are more "rural" which may lead to higher environmental values. But, on 
the other hand, medium and big cities are in general more active in implementing 
environmental polices, according Local Agenda 21 exigencies
20. So, that fact could lead 
to higher preferences for environment protection.  
Additionally, the survey provides the information in which Spanish region an 
individual lives. Thus, one of the main advantages in this study is the chance to control 
for regional differences. Witzke and Urfei (2001) point out that ‘empirical knowledge 
about regional differences in demand for environmental goods is usually difficult to 
come by’ (p. 213)
21. Thus, regional dummies for all 17 SPANISH REGIONS called 
Autonomous Communities are built. Navarra and the Basque Country are defined as 
foral regime communities or charter regions, and the other 15 regions are defined as 
common regime communities. Although Navarra and the Basque Country have the 
highest financial autonomy among Spanish regions, the remaining communities have 
                                                 
19 In this respect, Witzke and Urfei  (2001) included the variable ‘households in the building’ as a proxy 
of the rural/urban character of the town/city.  
20 In this respect, Font and Subirats (2000) showed some big and medium size municipalities’ experiences 
to implement  Agenda 21 objectives in a local context. 
21 As an exception see also Cameron and Englin (1997).   17
obtained additional competences and financial instruments during the last years   
(Monasterio and Suárez-Pandiello 2005).  
Finally, a TIME variable has been included. Franzen (2003, p. 297) argues that 
the general level of concern for the natural environment has globally increased in the 
last 50 years. This can also be observed by the rise in international environmental 
treaties, the number of national environmental ministries and the increase in 
international nongovernmental organizations. However, the preference to pay higher 
taxes in order to prevent environmental damage may be strongly connected to the 
environmental efforts made by the governments. If people are more satisfied with the 
environmental policy, they may believe that it is not necessary to pay additional taxes to 
reduce environmental damages. This may lead to a lower willingness to contribute.  
After the Rio agreements in 1992 and the approval of the Agenda for the 21
st 
century, the EU developed the V Environmental Program (1993-2000). In that 
document, several explicit strategies were designed, and members had to adapt their 
regulations to this Program’s framework. In Spain, there was a concentration of 
initiatives and regulations in the second part of the 90s. During the period 1995-2000 
institutions were created to improve the environment, and in special areas such as the 
reduction of certain emissions or the improvement of several environmental 
infrastructures, progresses are evident (OECD 2004). At the same time, from 1994 on, 
Spain began to receive European Structural Funds to finance environmental protection 
investments. Thus, strong improvements in the second half of the 90s may lead to a 
higher individual satisfaction with the environmental public policy and thus to a lower 
willingness to increase the contribution to prevent environmental damage.  
Moreover, some specific factors made people more sensitive to solving 
environmental problems. A good example was one of the most severe drought periods   18
in Spain from 1992-1996. To cope with this drought, some rationing measures were put 
into practice, such as cuts in supply or reductions in water pressure. And, usually, the 
scarce quantity of water was aggravated by quality problems. This kind of 
environmental problems affects the population directly.  They become aware of the 
necessity to intensify public environmental initiatives, which may have led to an 
increasing willingness to contribute for environmental protection in Spain, especially in 
the first half of the 90s.  
Furthermore, as mentioned previously, individuals’ environmental attitudes are 
also influenced by the current level of the tax burden. In Spain, an income tax reform in 
1998 led to a reduction of the average tax rates by 2% from a static point of view and 
under a partial equilibrium context (Castañer et. al 2004). Moreover, the disposable 
income of all taxpayers became on average 2.6% higher.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We will use an ordered probit model to analyze the ranking information of the scaled 
dependent variable. We also estimate weighted ordered probit models to correct the 
samples and thus to get a reflection of the national distribution. As we pool several 
years and data sets together we have integrated an additional weighting variable   
(weighted var 1). The original weight variable was multiplied by a constant to get an 
equal number of weighted observations (around 1500) for each survey (weighted var 2).
  
The data sets provide the weighting variables. To measure the quantitative effect of a 
variable on environmental values, the marginal effects are calculated, as the equation 
has a nonlinear form. The marginal effect indicates the change in the percentage of 
citizens (or the probability of) having a specific environmental level value, when the 
independent variable increases by one unit. For simplicity, in all estimations the   19
marginal effects are only presented for the highest value. Furthermore, “I don’t know” 
answers and missing values were omitted in all estimations. 
This section reports two groups of estimation results. Table 2 presents baseline 
estimation checking the robustness of the results working with or without weighting 
variables. Furthermore, to reduce possible causality problems, 2SLS estimations are 
presented. The primary objective in Table 3 is to investigate the robustness of the 
informal education or better the impact of political interest on environmental values. To 
do so, several proxies are developed and tested sequentially. Furthermore, due to the 
relatively high number of missing values, proxies of the economic situation have also 
been included in Table 3 sequentially.  
In line with our prediction, we observe a negative correlation between age and 
environmental attitudes. In almost all estimations the coefficient is statistically 
significant. Female report a higher preference to contribute than men. The coefficient is 
statistically not significant in the non-weighted estimations, but significant in the first 
weighted estimations in Table 2 and 3. Estimation 2 indicates that being female rather 
than male increases the probability of a person to strongly agree to increase taxes to 
prevent environmental damage by 1.5 percentage points. Interestingly, the coefficient is 
not statistically significant anymore after controlling for the economic situations of the 
respondents.  
A positive relationship between formal education and environmental attitudes 
can be observed. However, the coefficient loses its significance when the second 
weighting variable is used, 2SLS is run and the economic situation of the individuals is 
included. Informal education has a much stronger impact on individuals’ environmental 
attitudes. One of the key findings in this study is the fact that political interest is highly 
correlated with the preferences to contribute. An increase in the level of discussing   20
politics by one unit increases the share of subjects reporting the highest willingness to 
contribute between 2.5 and 2.9 percentage points. This result is confirmed when using 
two further proxies (INTEREST IN POLITICS and IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS), 
both cases yield marginal effects close the 2 percentage points. Thus, the paper shows 
that we have to go beyond formal education and include individuals’ interest for current 
political matters. As mentioned in the theoretical part, this aspect has been neglected in 
previous studies. What about individuals’ ideology? In line with our predictions, people 
with a rightist orientation are less willing to contribute and pay higher taxes to prevent 
environmental damages. This statement may not be affected by different environmental 
attitudes only, but also by a general rejection of tax increases. However, the marginal 
effects are relatively low. Furthermore, it should be noticed that the ideology variable 
has many missing values, which makes it impossible to include the variable 
simultaneously in all the regressions.  
  There are no statistically significant differences among the marital variables and 
the employment situation. On the other hand, we find evidence that the economic 
situation matters, as mentioned previously. Due to the relatively high number of missing 
values these variables have been sequentially included in the last two estimations. The 
results indicate that a higher financial satisfaction leads to a higher preference to 
contribute (see Estimation 9). This result remains robust after controlling for 
individuals’ perception of their economic class status, although in both estimations, the 
marginal effects are not very high. Interestingly, upper middle class people show the 
highest level of environmental preferences, with marginal effects of 3.5 percentage 
points, followed by the lower middle class (3.3 percentage points) and the upper class 
(0.5 percentage, with a coefficient that is not statistically significant). Thus, there is a   21
non-linear relationship between economic class and environmental attitudes. That fact 
can be seen as a confirmation of Kuznet’s hypothesis at the individual level. 
  Tables 2 and 3 also show that social capital matters. Trusting others leads to a 
higher preference for environmental protection. An increase in the trust scale by one 
unit raises the share of people reporting the highest preference between 3.1 and 3.6 
percentage points. Not surprisingly being a member of a voluntary environmental 
organization leads to a higher willingness to accept a tax increase, the probability of 
stating the highest values increasing by more than 7.3 percentage points and showing 
thus the highest marginal effects. This might, however, be due to people with high 
values choose to participate in a voluntary environmental organization. As the causality 
is not clear due to a selection bias, we apply an instrumental variable technique. A 
suitable instrument must be contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term but 
must be highly correlated with a membership in a voluntary environmental 
organization. In our case, we use the dummy variable NOT A MEMBER OF A 
VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION as an instrumental variable, which covers all 
possible voluntary organizations and not only environmental ones. The variable is not 
correlated with the error term (r=-0.03) and highly correlated with being a member of a 
voluntary environmental organization (r=-0.30). The 2SLS estimations are presented in 
the equations 4 and 5 using the two available weighting variables. The equations 
indicate that the results are consistent with the ordered probit estimations. Therefore we 
decided to continue with ordered probit estimations to take into account the ranking 
information of the dependent variable.  
  A higher level of national pride is also correlated with a higher preferences 
towards environmental protection, although the coefficient loses its significance in the 
last three estimations in Table 3. However, the lack of significance may be driven by a   22
significantly lower number of observations. The GEOGRAPHIC GROUP variable 
shows that people in the reference group (locality or town) have the lowest preference to 
contribute (all coefficients have a positive sign). On the other hand, the group world as 
a whole shows the strongest difference to the reference group and the highest preference 
for environmental protection, being statistically significant in almost all estimations 
with marginal effects between 2.6 and 3.8 percentage points. The factor TOWN SIZE 
shows some interesting implications. People living in a town with less than 2’000 
inhabitants have the lowest value. The highest preference can be found in the town size 
50’000-100’000. On the other hand, individuals living in a town with 500’000 and more 
inhabitants show lower values, closer to those from towns with 5-10’000 inhabitants. 
The relationship is not entirely linear. The high level of environmental attitudes in town 
sizes of 50’000-100’000 may be due to their not being big enough to induce a strong 
free-riding mentality in the anonymous city, but big enough to be able to implement 
strong and active environmental programs.  
Figure 1 
 Environmental Protection Expenditures 1995-1999 

































Strong regional differences between Spanish regions are found. To detect a possible 
reason for this we calculate the environmental protection expenditures per km
2 for the 
years 1995 and 1999
22 (INE 2004). Those values are shown in Figure 1.  
All in all, regions with negative coefficients in the estimations have relatively 
higher levels of environmental protection expenditures per km
2 (except the Cantabria 
Region). In this case, the argument can be similar to the time-factor explanation. The 
higher the expenditures, the higher citizens’ satisfaction with public policies in matters 
of environmental protection, which leads to a decrease in the preference to pay higher 
taxes for that “public good”. The regional income level can be an additional argument to 
explain the negative coefficients of some Autonomous Communities (CCAA). 
Communities like Baleares, Comunidad Valenciana or Cataluña are characterized by 
high GDP per capita levels. This might reflect a trade-off between economic activity 
and preferences for protecting the environment. 
Finally, we take a look at the development over time. The results are largely in 
line with our expectations. We find a strong increase of the willingness to contribute 
between 1990 and 1995, a period with new environmental programs launched after the 
Rio agreement and the development of the V EU Environmental Program. On the other 
hand, between 1995 and 1999/2000 a very strong decrease is observable. The attitudes 
towards environmental protection by means of higher taxes in 1999/2000 is statistically 
significantly lower than in 1990, with marginal effects between 2.5 and 3.2 percentage 
points. Possible reasons for the decay in the second half of the 90s are the 
improvements of the environmental infrastructure and institutions as well as the 
                                                 
22 The Ceuta and Melilla Region has been excluded from the graph because it is an outlier. Only 
information about 1995 and 1999 is available.   24
financial support from the European Structural Funds to support investments in 
environmental protection.  
In general, if people perceive the environmental damages more closely, they will 
be willing to pay more money in order to improve the quality of the environment. As 
discussed in Section II, a good example for this was one of the most severe drought 
periods in the first half of the nineties (1992-1996). Additionally, the tax burden has not 
increased between 1995 and 1999/2000. Thus, the development of the tax burden is not 
a valid argument to explain the decrease of environmental attitudes.  
Furthermore, the situation at the end of the 90s does not allow to speak of a real 
“green” tax reform in Spain. Although having good administrative conditions to 
implement environmental taxation, the Spanish fiscal system has not included taxes on 
emissions, and sometimes, environmental taxes are poorly designed and rather used to 
get additional revenues than to really handle existing environmental problems (Gago 
and Labandeira 1999). Thus, environmental taxes are not significantly higher in 
1999/2000 compared to the other years in the analysis.    25
Table 2: Determinants of the preferences for environmental protection in Spain 
 
   unweighted     weighted  var 1     weighted var2     weighted  var 1  weighted var2 
  ordered probit    ordered probit    ordered probit    2SLS    2SLS   
ORDERED   Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.  Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.  Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. z-Stat. 
PROBIT     Effects    Effects    Effects      
INDEPENDENT V.  1        2        3        4     5    
                      
Socio-Demographic Factors                      
AGE  -0.003**  -2.08 -0.001  -0.003*  -1.92 -0.001  -0.003*  -1.75 -0.001  -0.002**  -2.02 -0.002*  -1.74 
MALE (r.g.)                       GENDER 
FEMALE  0.049  1.30 0.010  0.085**  2.12 0.017  0.070  1.62 0.015  0.075**  2.39 0.068**  2.01 
MARRIED  0.009 0.21  0.002  -0.005  -0.10  -0.001  0.003 0.07  0.001  0.015 0.42  0.026 0.65 
DIVORCED  -0.135 -0.80  -0.026  -0.172 -0.93  -0.030  -0.141 -0.74  -0.027  -0.156 -1.12  -0.117 -0.81 
SEPARATED  0.066 0.54  0.014  0.017 0.14  0.003  0.005 0.03  0.001  0.051 0.56  0.047 0.44 
WIDOWED  -0.091 -1.11  -0.018  -0.111 -1.28  -0.021  -0.122 -1.34  -0.024  -0.067 -0.99  -0.073 -1.04 
MARITAL STATUS 
SINGLE (r.g.)                      
Formal and Informal Education                      
EDUCATION  0.007**  1.99 0.002  0.007*  1.88 0.001  0.006  1.41 0.001  0.003  0.96 0.002  0.69 
DISCUSSING POLITICS  0.123*** 4.88  0.025 0.146*** 5.36  0.029 0.132*** 4.36  0.028 0.099*** 4.71 0.089*** 3.89 
Occupational Status                      
FULL TIME EMPLOYED 
(r.g.)                      
PART TIME EMPLOYED  -0.027 -0.36  -0.005  -0.078 -0.98  -0.015  -0.018 -0.21  -0.004  -0.111*  -1.74  -0.072 -1.04 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.026 0.43  0.005  0.017 0.25  0.003  0.014 0.19  0.003  0.001 0.03  -0.007  -0.13 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.019 -0.32  -0.004  -0.075 -1.18  -0.014  -0.053 -0.78  -0.011  -0.068 -1.35  -0.059 -1.09 
AT HOME  -0.001 -0.02  0.000  -0.034 -0.62  -0.007  -0.069 -1.18  -0.014  -0.039 -0.91  -0.075 -1.63 
STUDENT  0.090 1.31  0.019  0.063 0.84  0.013  0.009 0.11  0.002  0.055 0.95  0.022 0.35 
RETIRED  -0.023 -0.37  -0.005  -0.040 -0.62  -0.008  -0.066 -0.93  -0.014  -0.031 -0.63  -0.059 -1.09 
EMPLOYMENT  
STATUS 
OTHER  -0.028 -0.16  -0.006  -0.058 -0.31  -0.011  0.014  0.07  0.003  -0.056 -0.39  -0.012 -0.08 
Social Capital                        26
TRUST  0.147*** 4.69  0.031 0.156*** 4.64  0.031 0.142*** 3.90  0.031 0.115*** 4.43 0.100*** 3.61 
MEMBER VOLUNT.   0.338*** 3.66  0.083 0.338*** 3.56  0.079 0.317*** 2.98  0.078 1.125*** 3.97 0.977*** 3.46  ENVIRON.  
ORGAN.  NOT A MEMBER (r.g.)                      
Identification                      
NATIONAL PRIDE  0.044** 2.01  0.009  0.046** 1.98  0.009  0.055** 2.18  0.012  0.046** 2.51  0.051** 2.57 
LOCALITY OR TOWN (r.g.)                     
STATE OR REGION  0.056  1.35 0.012  0.078*  1.78 0.016  0.075  1.63 0.016  0.061*  1.79 0.058  1.64 
COUNTRY AS A WHOLE  0.059 1.53  0.012  0.063 1.55  0.013  0.027 0.61  0.006  0.051 1.60  0.024 0.68 
CONTINENT AS A WHOLE 0.078 0.99  0.017  0.112 1.30  0.023  0.118 1.24  0.027  0.086 1.32  0.088 1.25 
GEOGRAPHIC 
 GROUP 
WORLD AS A WHOLE  0.126*  1.89 0.028  0.129*  1.82 0.027  0.168**  2.04 0.038  0.091*  1.67 0.106*  1.72 
Other variables                      
UNDER 2,000 (r.g.)                      
2,000 - 5,000  0.166**  2.23 0.037  0.104  1.27 0.021  0.112  1.30 0.025  0.063  0.99 0.059  0.88 
5,000 - 10,000  0.120*  1.73 0.026  0.102  1.31 0.021  0.154*  1.83 0.035  0.053  0.87 0.079  1.20 
10,000 - 20,000  0.153**  2.18 0.034  0.128*  1.68 0.027  0.220***  2.74 0.051  0.078  1.32 0.137**  2.24 
20,000 - 50,000  0.107  1.63 0.023  0.171**  2.34 0.036  0.170**  2.14 0.038  0.111*  1.96 0.102*  1.68 
50,000 - 100,000  0.299*** 3.90  0.071 0.258*** 3.17  0.057 0.301*** 3.43  0.073 0.171*** 2.72 0.195*** 2.89 
100,000 - 500,000  0.178*** 2.97  0.038 0.206*** 3.13  0.043 0.248*** 3.52  0.056 0.137*** 2.67 0.158*** 2.91 
SIZE OF TOWN 
500,000 and MORE  0.096  1.46 0.020  0.152**  2.13 0.032  0.206***  2.68 0.047  0.089  1.60 0.118**  1.98 
ANDALUCIA  -0.129**  -2.06 -0.025  -0.126*  -1.91 -0.024  -0.098 -1.26  -0.020  -0.105**  -2.07  -0.072 -1.22 
ARAGON  0.191*  1.94 0.043  0.153  1.30 0.033  0.170  1.46 0.039  0.101  1.12 0.138  1.57 
ASTURIAS  0.156 1.46  0.035  0.179 1.57  0.039  0.184 1.52  0.043  0.136 1.57  0.154*  1.67 
BALEARES  -0.290***  -2.64 -0.050  -0.256**  -2.06 -0.043  -0.384*** -2.65  -0.065 -0.207**  -2.18 -0.288*** -2.69 
CATALUNA  -0.257*** -4.19  -0.048 -0.332*** -5.22  -0.057 -0.172** -2.36  -0.034  -0.248***  -5.06  -0.107*  -1.91 
CANARIAS  -0.167*  -1.69 -0.031  -0.169  -1.56 -0.030  -0.008  -0.07 -0.002  -0.163*  -1.93 -0.028  -0.31 
CANTABRIA  -0.337***  -2.66 -0.057  -0.260*  -1.87 -0.044  -0.146  -0.94 -0.028  -0.183*  -1.70 -0.085  -0.73 
CASTILLA-LEON  0.296*** 3.94  0.070 0.228*** 2.90  0.050 0.275*** 3.02  0.066 0.154  2.61 0.192*** 2.85 
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA  -0.225**  -2.56 -0.041  -0.184*  -1.83 -0.033  -0.022 -0.18  -0.005  -0.157**  -2.04  -0.028 -0.32 
EXTREMADURA  0.238**  2.12 0.055  0.183  1.62 0.040  0.364***  2.93 0.092  0.111  1.33 0.238***  2.68 
GALICIA  -0.237*** -2.94  -0.043 -0.278*** -3.29  -0.047 -0.097 -0.97  -0.020  -0.213***  -3.31  -0.066 -0.88 
SPANISH REGION 
RIOJA  0.069 0.57  0.015  0.004 0.03  0.001  0.093 0.53  0.021  -0.024  -0.23  0.032 0.23   27
MADRID (r.g.)                      
MURCIA  0.119 1.11  0.026  0.175 1.51  0.038  0.164 1.14  0.038  0.147 1.62  0.143 1.23 
NAVARRA  -0.041 -0.34  -0.008  -0.140 -1.08  -0.025  -0.078 -0.57  -0.016  -0.094 -0.95  -0.029 -0.28 
PAIS VASCO  -0.067 -0.76  -0.013  -0.019 -0.21  -0.004  0.018  0.18  0.004  -0.008 -0.12  0.035  0.45 
 
COMUNIDAD 
VALENCIANA  -0.165**  -2.39 -0.031  -0.247***  -3.29 -0.043  -0.156* -1.93  -0.031  -0.212***  -3.58  -0.138**  -2.17 
SPAIN 90 (r.g.)                      
SPAIN 95  0.258*** 5.84  0.058 0.261*** 5.60  0.055 0.249*** 5.32  0.054 0.140*** 3.42 0.140*** 3.53 
TIME 
SPAIN 1999/2000  -0.138*** -3.16  -0.028 -0.150*** -3.29  -0.029 -0.159*** -3.40  -0.032 -0.106*** -3.04 -0.112*** -3.14 
(Pseudo)  R2  0.031     0.037     0.035     0.053   0.046  
Number  of  observations  5226     5226     5226     5226  5226  
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000     0.000    
Dependent variable: environmental morality on a four point scale. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Marginal effect = highest environmental 
value score (3). Instrument in the 2SLS for MEMBER VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION: NOT A MEMBER OF A VOLUNTARY 
ORGANIZATION. Data Spain 1999/2000 covers the European Values Survey (EVS) 1999 and the World Values Survey (WVS) data 2000. A dummy variable has been 
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Table 3: Further Factors that Shape Individuals’ preferences for environmental protection in Spain 
 
   weighted  var 1     weighted  var 1     weighted  var 1     weighted  var 1     weighted  var 1    
  ordered probit    ordered probit    ordered probit    ordered probit    ordered probit   
  Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg. 
     Effects     Effects    Effects      Effects      Effects 
INDEPENDENT V.  6        7        8        9        10       
Demographic Factors                            
AGE  -0.003*  -1.96 -0.001  -0.003**  -2.00 -0.001  -0.002  -0.91 -3E-004  -0.003**  -2.05  -0.001  -0.003*  -1.78  -0.001 
MALE  (r.g.)                             GENDER 
FEMALE  0.082**  2.06 0.016  0.078*  1.96 0.015  0.101**  2.23 0.021 0.059  1.32  0.013  0.063 1.37  0.014 
MARRIED  0.006 0.13 0.001  0.010 0.22 0.002  -0.008  -0.16 -0.002  -0.007  -0.13  -0.001  -0.032  -0.60  -0.007 
DIVORCED  -0.145 -0.80 -0.026  -0.118 -0.65 -0.022  -0.226  -1.09 -0.041 -0.208  -0.95  -0.040  -0.217 -0.98  -0.041 
SEPARATED  0.016 0.13 0.003  0.009 0.08 0.002  0.100  0.74 0.022 -0.043  -0.35  -0.009  -0.069  -0.54  -0.014 
WIDOWED  -0.102 -1.18 -0.019  -0.097 -1.11 -0.018  -0.153  -1.48 -0.029 -0.116  -1.23  -0.023  -0.120 -1.24  -0.024 
MARITAL 
STATUS 
SINGLE  (r.g.)                            
Formal and informal education                            
EDUCATION  0.008*  1.94 0.001  0.007*  1.91 0.001  0.008**  1.79 0.002 0.004  0.96  0.001  0.001 0.31  0.0003 
DISCUSSING  POLITICS            0.131***  4.26  0.027  0.135***  4.47  0.029  0.134***  4.31  0.029 
INTEREST IN POLITICS  0.097***  5.18  0.019                         
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS        0.098*** 5.08  0.019                   
Idealogy                            
RIGHT POLITICAL ORIENTATION              -0.030***  -2.94  -0.006             
Economic Situation                            
UPPER  CLASS                       0.045  0.43  0.010 
UPPER MIDDLE 
CLASS                       0.153***  2.67  0.035 
LOWER MIDDLE 




ST  CLASS  (r.g.)                            
FINANCIAL  SATISFACTION                 0.027***  2.69  0.006  0.025**  2.33  0.005 
Occupational Status                              29
FULL TIME 
EMPLOYED  (r.g.)                            
PART TIME 
EMPLOYED  -0.080 -1.01 -0.015  -0.071 -0.90 -0.013  -0.100  -1.09 -0.019 -0.085  -0.97  -0.017  -0.095 -1.06  -0.019 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.023 0.35 0.005  0.028 0.43 0.006  0.018  0.25 0.004 -0.002  -0.03  0.000  0.001 0.02  0.000 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.052 -0.82 -0.010  -0.055 -0.86 -0.011  -0.065  -0.90 -0.013 -0.034  -0.47  -0.007  -0.003 -0.05  -0.001 
AT  HOME  -0.041 -0.75 -0.008  -0.042 -0.77 -0.008  0.007  0.11  0.001 -0.043  -0.70  -0.009  -0.029 -0.46  -0.006 
STUDENT  0.056 0.75 0.011  0.059 0.79 0.012  0.066  0.78 0.014 0.000  0.00  0.000  0.021 0.24  0.005 
RETIRED  -0.044 -0.68 -0.008  -0.051 -0.78 -0.010  -0.039  -0.53 -0.008 -0.027  -0.37  -0.006  -0.024 -0.32  -0.005 
EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS 
OTHER  -0.077 -0.41 -0.014  -0.076 -0.40 -0.014  -0.032  -0.14 -0.006 -0.295  -0.40  -0.053  -0.319 -0.43  -0.057 
Social Capital                            
TRUST  0.155***  4.61 0.031  0.155*** 4.61 0.031  0.166***  4.46 0.035 0.164***  4.35  0.036  0.162***  4.20  0.036 
MEMBER 
VOLUNT.   0.322***  3.30 0.075  0.317*** 3.24 0.073  0.423***  4.25 0.106 0.340***  3.17  0.086  0.292***  2.66  0.072 
ENVIRON.  
ORGAN. 
NOT A MEMBER 
(r.g.)                            
Identification                            
NATIONAL  PRIDE  0.047**  2.04 0.009  0.047**  2.02 0.009  0.040  1.52 0.008 0.011  0.42  0.002  0.007 0.25  0.001 
LOCALITY OR 
TOWN (r.g.)                            
STATE OR 
REGION  0.074*  1.69 0.015  0.067 1.52 0.013  0.059  1.15 0.012 0.044  0.90  0.010  0.046 0.91  0.010 
COUNTRY AS A 
WHOLE  0.060 1.46 0.012  0.052 1.28 0.010  0.051  1.11 0.011 0.035  0.75  0.008  0.072 1.50  0.016 
CONTINENT AS 
A  WHOLE  0.121 1.39 0.025  0.123 1.42 0.026  0.106  1.20 0.023 0.043  0.50  0.009  0.032 0.35  0.007 
GEOGRAPHIC 
 GROUP 
WORLD AS A 
WHOLE  0.131*  1.87 0.027  0.125*  1.79 0.026  0.121  1.53 0.026 0.155* 1.84  0.036  0.165*  1.93  0.038 
Other variables                            
UNDER 2,000 
(reference  group)                            
2,000 - 5,000  0.113  1.39  0.023  0.105  1.29  0.022  0.037  0.38  0.008  0.071  0.82  0.016  0.069  0.78  0.015 
5,000 - 10,000  0.116  1.50  0.024  0.110  1.43  0.023  0.014  0.15  0.003  0.169**  2.05  0.039  0.155*  1.82  0.036 
10,000 - 20,000  0.142*  1.88  0.030  0.144*  1.90  0.030  0.056  0.63  0.012  0.167**  2.07  0.038  0.169**  2.05  0.039 
SIZE OF TOWN 
20,000 - 50,000  0.168**  2.33  0.035  0.165**  2.29  0.035  0.108  1.22  0.023  0.179**  2.27  0.042  0.180**  2.21  0.042   30
50,000 - 100,000  0.256***  3.16  0.057  0.258*** 3.19  0.057  0.209**  2.14  0.047  0.303***  3.49  0.074  0.262***  2.92  0.063 
100,000 - 500,000  0.215***  3.31  0.045  0.215*** 3.31  0.045  0.114  1.44  0.024  0.279***  4.02  0.065  0.263***  3.64  0.061 
 
500,000 and 
MORE  0.149**  2.11 0.031  0.157**  2.22 0.033  0.090  1.07 0.019 0.184***  2.38  0.042  0.182**  2.27  0.042 
Andalucia  -0.131**  -1.98 -0.024  -0.133**  -2.01 -0.025  -0.153** -2.07  -0.029 -0.118  -1.53  -0.024  -0.102  -1.28  -0.021 
Aragon  0.179 1.50 0.039  0.153 1.29 0.033  0.225  1.62 0.052 0.278* 1.93  0.068  0.313**  2.19  0.078 
Asturias  0.169 1.50 0.036  0.161 1.43 0.034  0.096  0.78 0.021 0.216  1.64  0.052  0.270**  2.00  0.066 
Baleares  -0.250**  -2.06 -0.042  -0.252**  -2.06 -0.043  -0.183 -1.32  -0.034  -0.280**  -2.21  -0.051  -0.246*  -1.89  -0.046 
Cataluna -0.335*** -5.25  -0.057  -0.333*** -5.22 -0.057  -0.403***  -5.62 -0.070 -0.202*** -2.76  -0.040 -0.196*** -2.60 -0.039 
Canarias  -0.179*  -1.66 -0.032  -0.172 -1.60 -0.031  -0.144  -1.15 -0.027 -0.136  -1.06  -0.027  -0.078 -0.60  -0.016 
Cantabria  -0.233*  -1.69 -0.040  -0.230*  -1.67 -0.039  -0.090  -0.49 -0.017 -0.155  -1.06  -0.031  -0.128 -0.85  -0.026 
Castilla-Leon  0.212***  2.70 0.046  0.218*** 2.77 0.047  0.169*  1.87 0.037 0.197**  2.25  0.046  0.214**  2.40  0.050 
Castilla-La  Mancha  -0.217**  -2.12 -0.038  -0.215**  -2.09 -0.037  -0.173 -1.57  -0.032  -0.097 -0.83 -0.020  -0.107  -0.89  -0.022 
Extremadura  0.180 1.58 0.039  0.176 1.56 0.038  0.198  1.50 0.045 0.336***  2.83  0.085  0.357***  2.99  0.091 
Galicia -0.287*** -3.40  -0.048  -0.282*** -3.34 -0.048  -0.256***  -2.78 -0.046 -0.068 -0.68  -0.014  -0.032  -0.31  -0.007 
Rioja  -0.005 -0.04 -0.001  -0.023 -0.17 -0.005  -0.071  -0.44 -0.014  -0.032  -0.21  -0.007  0.0013  0.01  0.0003 
Madrid  (r.g.)                            
Murcia  0.130 1.14 0.027  0.138 1.22 0.029  0.172  1.29 0.039 0.272* 1.93  0.067  0.240 1.64  0.058 
Navarra  -0.152 -1.18 -0.027  -0.139 -1.06 -0.025  -0.154  -1.02 -0.029 -0.085  -0.65  -0.017  -0.065 -0.49  -0.014 




Valenciana  -0.251*** -3.33 -0.043  -0.251*** -3.33 -0.044  -0.283***  -3.43 -0.051  -0.284***  -3.31  -0.053  -0.268*** -3.04  -0.051 
SPAIN 1990 (r.g)                               
SPAIN  1995  0.261***  5.61 0.056  0.249*** 5.32 0.053  0.259***  4.78 0.058 0.257***  5.47  0.058  0.303***  5.80  0.069 
TIME 
SPAIN  1999/2000  -0.149*** -3.29 -0.029  -0.158*** -3.47 -0.031  -0.154*** -3.02  -0.032  -0.149*** -3.27  -0.031 -0.117**  -2.36 -0.025 
(Pseudo)  R2  0.037     0.037     0.035     0.035      0.037     
Number  of  observations  5232     5213     4033     4284      4086     
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
Dependent variable: environmental morality on a four point scale. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Marginal effect = highest environmental value score 
(3). A dummy variable has been added in the estimations to differentiate between EVS and WVS. Equation 9 and 10 covers only World Values Survey data. The used proxies on the 
economic situation were not available in the EVS 1999 data set.    31
The results obtained can help to design environmental policies in Spain. The 
most effective degree of decentralization to achieve specific environmental objectives 
remains a controversial topic. On the one hand side, regional differences are a 
significant argument to justify a decentralization process in this context. In fact, Spanish 
regions have obtained more environmental competences in the last few years. However, 
for some environmental policies in the European Union we observe the trend towards 
centralization
23. In this respect, it could be adequate to propose some kind of mixed 
policy, in order not to induce welfare losses in some Spanish regions, and thus to take 
into account regional differences. A decentralized policy in the Spanish regions, which 





Since the 1970s, the number of studies investigating environmental preferences has 
been growing.  However, we still lack papers analyzing a country and its regions or its 
development over time. Furthermore, it is a promising line to search empirically for 
factors neglected in previous studies. This paper aims therefore at reducing such 
shortcomings. To assess individuals’ environmental attitudes in Spain and its different 
regions over time we use data sets provided by the World Values Surveys (WVS) and 
the European Values Surveys (EVS) covering the years 1990 (WVS), 1995 (WVS) and 
1999/2000 (WVS and EVS). Regional dummy variables have been added to check for 
                                                 
23 For example, in the water resources field, the European Framework D2000/60/EC established a 
common guide for members to improve water quality and quantity aspects. The basic objective of the 
European regulation is to improve water quality and to achieve a rational use of water resources, in order 
to reduce pressure on those resources. The European Union is enforcing country members to apply this 
framework in the next few  years. The Spanish central government will have to adapt its regulation to 
the European Framework.   32
possible cross-regional variations. The results indeed indicate that there are differences 
between regions. Furthermore, we find big differences between the first half (strong 
increase of the environmental attitudes) and the second half of the 90s (strong decrease). 
A possible reason for regional differences and the development over time is a higher 
satisfaction with the environmental policy, which may lead to the belief that paying 
additional taxes is not necessary to reduce environmental damages.  
  Compared to many previous studies, we present in this paper a richer set of 
independent variables to better isolate the impact of a specific variable on individuals’ 
environmental attitudes. The results obtained from commonly used variables such as 
age, gender, formal education, and income are in line with the tendencies reported in the 
literature. This paper as a novelty shows the relevance of further variables neglected 
beforehand, such as political interest and social capital. These variables have a strong 
impact on the environmental attitudes. All three proxies for political interest have a 
statistically significant positive impact on individuals’ attitude to pay higher taxes, with 
high marginal effects. The rapid growth of the social capital literature inspired our 
efforts to check the importance of these variables on the environmental attitudes. 
Generalized trust, which can be seen as one of the key variables of societies’ social 
capital has also a strong impact on the environmental preferences. Not surprisingly, 
being in a member of a voluntary environmental organization has also a positive impact 
on environmental attitudes. As the causality is not clear, an instrumental approach has 
been chosen. We find robust and consistent results.   
All in all, investigating citizens’ environmental preferences underlines the 
importance of investigating a rich set of theories to fully understand what influences 
their willingness to contribute to the environmental protection. Understanding what 
shapes environmental attitudes still remains a fruitful field for further research.    33
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